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THE FRANCHISING DILEMMA CONTINUES:
UPDATE ON FRANCHISOR LIABILITY
FOR WRONGFUL ACTS BY
LOCAL FRANCHISEES
RANDALL K. HANSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine going into a New York City Burger King restaurant
for dinner. After dinner you ask for the key to the restroom, but
your request is refused. Further assume the reason you were
refused the right to use the restroom is because you are an African
American male.1 Next, imagine being disabled and being unable
to gain access to locally owned San Antonio Dairy Queen stores.2
Finally, imagine being robbed and assaulted as you enter a hotel
room. The hotel is locally owned and operated, but is a franchisee
of Howard Johnson, a nationally recognized hotel chain.3 Are
local franchisees solely responsible for events such as these, or can
the franchisor be required to accept responsibility for such activi-
ties as well?
Customers of franchisees are anxious to reach into the deep
pockets of franchisors. When customers are injured they instinc-
tively expect compensation from the franchisor. Since they relied
on the national image and advertising in deciding to do business
with the franchise, the customers expect the franchisor to compen-
* Professor of Business Law, University of North Carolina at Wilmington;
LL.M., 1987, Southern Methodist University; J.D., 1979, University of North
Dakota; B.S.B.A., 1976, University of North Dakota. The author wishes to
acknowledge finding from the Cameron School of Business Administration
Research Fund at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. This article
is an update to an earlier article by the author on Franchisor Liability. See
Randall K. Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for Actions
of a Local Franchisee, 19 N.C. CEN-T. L.J. 190 (1991).
1. See Perry v. Burger King Corp., 924 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
2. See Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 704 (1996).
3. See Watson v. Howard Johnson Franchise Sys., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 758 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1995).
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sate them for their injuries.4 However, these customers often fail
to realize that they are dealing with a locally owned franchisee
rather than a national franchisor. 5 In deciding cases, courts are
likely to focus on the extent of control exerted by the franchisor
over the franchisee. The greater the franchisor's control the more
likely the franchisor will be held liable.
This means that franchisors are often confronted with a per-
plexing dilemma. They are practically compelled by Federal law to
closely control and supervise local operations in order to protect
their trademark and to assure customers of consistent, high qual-
ity products or services.6 Yet, when franchisors exert the control
necessary to be in accordance with Federal law, their legitimate
intentions may in essence backfire and leave them legally liable
for the actions of the local franchisee.
Determining the appropriate level of liability for franchisors
is perplexing.7 Broad liability for franchisors drives up their costs
and threatens the viability of the franchisor-franchisee format,
while narrow liability potentially fails to adequately protect vic-
tims. Equity demands a delicate balance of the recognizable
dilemma for franchisors resulting from broader liability for
franchisors and the understandable expectations of customers.
Despite this, one thing is for certain: franchising is here to
stay. Recent estimates indicate that franchising accounts for
more than $800 billion in annual sales and service contracts.8
Over 40 percent of all retail sales involve franchises and more
than eight million people are employed by franchises in over half a
million outlets.9 With the widespread use of franchising arrange-
4. See Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for
Franchisors, 45 BUSINESS LAWYER 289 (1989); see also William M. Borchard &
David W. Ehrlich, Franchisor Tort Liability: Minimizing the Potential Liability
of a Franchisor for a Franchisee's Torts, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 109 (1979).
5. See Phoebe Carter, Annotation, Franchisor's Tort Liability for Injuries
Allegedly Caused by Assault or Other Criminal Activity on or Near Franchise
Premises, 2 A.L.R.5th 369, 380 (1992).
6. See Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A
Critique, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 89, 99 (1993); Michael R. Biggs & Matthew
C. Hesse, The Franchisor's Liability When Its Franchisee Goes Public, 5
FRANCHISE L.J. 1, 20-21 (1986).
7. For a more in-depth discussion of the pros and cons of franchisor liability
see Randall K Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for
Actions of a Local Franchisee, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 190, 192-94 (1991).
8. OFFICE OF INDUSTRIES, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, INDUSTRY AND TRADE
SUMMARY FOR FRANCHISING (1995).
9. Id.
[Vol. 20:91
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ments it is no surprise that there are increasing numbers of law-
suits against franchisors by customers injured by actions of a
franchisee.
The purpose of this update is to review recent franchisor lia-
bility cases to determine the direction of franchisor liability cases.
The three most common theories used to invoke franchisor liabil-
ity will be discussed, and North Carolina's approach to this area of
the law will also be examined.
II. THIRD PARTY CLAIMs AGAINST FRANCHISORS WHEN
CUSTOMERS ARE INJURED
There are three main theories asserted when a customer
seeks to recover from a franchisor for injuries suffered at a locally
owned franchise. First, that the franchisee is an actual agent for
the franchisor; second, that there is an apparent agency relation-
ship; and finally, that the franchisor is liable under a negligence
theory.
A. Actual Agency Based On Control
Essentially, under the actual agency theory, the franchisor
may have created liability due to the establishment of a principal/
agent relationship. Such a relationship may occur when a
franchisor exerts extensive control over the activities of the fran-
chisee, and such activities must be carried out in accordance with
the instructions of the franchisor. 10 As principal, the franchisor
may be held liable for the actions of the franchisee." Factors
which will encourage plaintiffs' attorneys and increase the
chances of recovery include the following: franchisor premises
inspections; the right to conduct unannounced random inspections
of inventory, records, and assets; location approval; architectural
approval; dimension requirement for furniture, fixtures, and
equipment; specific signage and decorating requirements; prohibi-
tion on selling any products or services other than those of the
franchisor; pricing and menu controls; franchise renewal depen-
dent upon compliance with franchisor rules; guidelines for
mandatory training programs; controls over operational proce-
dures; advertising restrictions; prescribed book-keeping require-
10. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958).
11. Flynn, supra note 6, at 91; Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors' Liability
When Franchisees are Apparent Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of
"Common Knowledge" About Franchising, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 620-21
(1992).
1997]
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ments; control over trademark usage; extensive operations
manual with required compliance.
One of the early successful cases against a franchisor under
an actual agency theory is Singleton v. International Dairy Queen,
Inc. 12 In Singleton, a young girl was injured when a glass door
broke as she entered a locally owned Dairy Queen.13 The victim
fell on the glass, severely, cutting herself.'4 The franchisor
brought a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the local
Dairy Queen was an independent contractor and as such the
franchisor was not liable for the actions of the franchisee. 5 The
victim avoided the summary judgment motion by asserting that
the franchisor supplied the remodeling designs that included the
door specifications. 16 The court examined in detail the types of
control exerted by the Dairy Queen over local franchisees and con-
cluded that the control exerted was extensive. 17 The control fac-
tors present created a genuine fact issue as to whether the
relationship between Dairy Queen and the local franchise was a
master-servant relationship or an independent contractor rela-
tionship and the court concluded that it was appropriate for a jury
to decide that issue.' Therefore, the court refused to release the
franchisor from having to defend against the victim's claim.' 9
Although this case merely denied summary judgment for the
franchisor, it caused concern for franchisors in general because of
the control language used in the court's opinion.
One of the first highly publicized cases against a franchisor
involved a fast food chain. In McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight,
Inc. ,20 a fast food franchisor was sued after a driver employed by a
local franchisee struck plaintiffs decedent while making a deliv-
ery.21 The court reviewed the extensive controls set in place by
the franchisor. These controls included requirements that the
franchisee buy equipment, supplies, and food products as well as
follow cooking specifications and menu prices. 22 The franchisee
12. 332 A.2d 160 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975). See Flynn, supra note 6, at 100.
13. Singleton, 332 A.2d at 161.
14. Id. at 160-61.
15. Id. at 162.
16. Id. at 161.
17. Id. at 162.
18. Id. at 162-63.
19. Id. at 163.
20. 321 A.2d 456 (Conn. 1973).
21. Id. at 457.
22. Id. at 458.
[Vol. 20:91
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was also forced to maintain a delivery system.23 Location, con-
struction, and remodeling all had to comply with franchisor speci-
fications.2 4 The franchisor also retained inspections rights.25
After reviewing these controls, the court concluded that the con-
trols in place were not sufficient to invoke liability.26
The 1990's version of the Chicken Delight case would likely
involve Domino's Pizza. Throughout the United States, there
have been hundreds of lawsuits commenced against Domino's
Pizza after drivers injured victims while making deliveries.2 7 Vic-
tims alleged that the franchisor controlled the local franchisees in
the usual ways, but also had in place a company policy of a thirty-
minute delivery guarantee.28 Victims argued that this policy
resulted in young drivers driving at excessive speeds to make
timely deliveries.29 For years, Domino's argued that the drivers
were independent contractors, not employees. If correct, agency
principles and respondeat superior would not apply. Domino's
further argued that the guaranteed delivery area was small and
that they were fast in the kitchen, not on the road.3"
Parker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.31 shows that these arguments
were not successful. This case arose after two pedestrians, while
in the process of rendering aid to victims of an accident allegedly
caused by a Domino's driver, were struck by another vehicle. 2
Domino's sought and initially received summary judgment by
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 459-60.
27. Georgia Sargent, Domino's Quick Delivery: Public Safety v. Profits, 25
TRIAL 16 (Nov. 1989).
28. Id.
29. Id. The author states:
Domino's Pizza guarantees a delivery within 30 minutes of the order. If
not, Domino's will give the customer a free pizza or refund $3, depending
on where the customer lives. Many trial lawyers contend that delivering
pizzas hot costs too much in life and limb. At least 100 suits are pending
against the company. Claimants allege that Domino's drivers, many of
them young and inexperienced, have injured them or killed their family
members in their rush to be good employees and back up the guarantee.
Id.
30. Id.
31. 629 So. 2d 1026 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
32. Id. at 1027.
19971
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alleging that the delivery driver was neither an agent nor
employee, but rather an independent contractor. 33
On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeals overturned
the grant of summary judgment. 4 The court stated it would look
not at actual control asserted by Domino's but rather the right to
control.3 In reviewing the franchise agreement the appeals court
specifically noted 24 control factors which Domino's asserted over
their local franchisee.36 The controls included: sales quotas, site
and plan approval, food preparation, signage and decorating
requirements, mandatory training program for employees of the
local operation, company inspections, quality standards regarding
every single item served by the franchisee, strict advertising
restrictions, new ideas of local employees became Domino prop-
erty, franchisee was required to obtain general liability insurance
naming Domino's as an additional insured, and a random inspec-
tion provision.3 7 In the Domino's operations manual the local fran-
chisee was required to comply with a requirement that "a
Domino's pizza is delivered within 30 minutes after the order is
taken. Pickup pizzas are ready in 10 minutes."3 In terse lan-
guage, the court stated:
The manual which Domino's provides to its franchisees is a
veritable bible for overseeing a Domino's operation. It contains
prescriptions for every conceivable facet of the business: from the
elements of preparing the perfect pizza to maintaining accurate
books; from advertising and promotional ideas to tending rules;
from organization to sanitation. the manual even offers a wide
array of techniques for "boxing and cutting" the pizza, as well as
tips on running the franchise to achieve and optimum profit. The
manual literally leaves nothing to chance. 39
Almost simultaneously with this Florida loss, Domino's suf-
fered another staggering legal defeat. In December of 1993, a St.
Louis jury rendered a $78,000,000 judgment against Domino's
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1029.
35. Id. at 1027.
36. Id. at 1028.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1029.
39. Id.
[Vol. 20:91
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol20/iss1/2
THE FRANCHISING DILEMMA CONTINUES
after another accident by a local driver.40 Domino's immediately
dropped its thirty minute guarantee.41
The actual agency theory was recently used in a 1996 case
involving a Texas Jack-in-the-Box restaurant.42 In this case, the
plaintiffs' son was fatally shot by a co-worker during a 1994 rob-
bery of the restaurant by the co-worker and others.43 Plaintiffs
asserted that the franchisor exerted extensive control over the
franchisee, thus creating an agency relationship.4 4 The control
factors alleged by the plaintiffs included: the franchisor retained
sole discretion as to equipment used; the service format and oper-
ation procedures; all improvements had to authorized by the
franchisor; the franchisor's training program had to be followed;
inspections rights were retained; and the franchisor had control
over the hours of operation.45 The franchisor attempted to avoid
liability by asserting that the franchisee was an independent con-
tractor and by further pointing out that the franchise agreement
specified that the franchisee was deemed an independent contrac-
tor and not an agent.46 The agreement had a provision which
stated that the franchisor had no control over the terms and condi-
tions of employment of the franchisee's employees.47
The court, applying Texas law,4 held in favor of the
franchisor, concluding that an agency relationship was not estab-
lished.49 The court indicated that the plaintiffs had to establish
"that the principal has the right to assign the agent's task and the
right to control the means and details by which the agent will
accomplish the task" in order to establish an agency relation-
ship.50 The court conceded that the "franchisee was required to
40. Huge Jury Award Stops 30 Minute Delivery, N. Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1993, at
E2.
41. Id.
42. Smith v. Foodmaker, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
43. Id. at 684.
44. Id. The parents also alleged that the franchisor negligently failed to
provide adequate security and that the defendants negligently hired the troubled
co-worker.
45. Id. at 685.
46. Id. at 687.
47. Id.
48. The court faced a conflict of law argument centering around whether
Texas law or California law should be applicable to the case, and, while applying
Texas law, the court concluded that California law would have reached the same
conclusion. Id. at 685.
49. Smith, 928 S.W.2d at 687.
50. Id.
1997]
7
Hanson: The ranchising Dilemma Continues: Update on Franchisor Liability
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
follow certain corporate standards, [but] the day-to-day operation
... was delegated fully" to the franchisee.51 In citing a California
case, the court stated that mere licensing of trade names does not
create an agency relationship5 2 and the control necessary to estab-
lish an agency relationship must go "beyond those necessary to
protect and maintain its trademark, trade name, and good will."53
Essentially, control of the day-to-day operation was the element
the Texas court looked for to establish an actual agency
relationship.
A 1996 case involving Dairy Queen sheds further light on
potential franchisor liability. Although this case did not explicitly
involve an actual agency theory, the theory asserted was closely
related. In Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp. 5' a disabled cus-
tomer brought a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).55 The plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair, alleged that
Dairy Queen had violated the ADA by failing to make locally
owned San Antonio, Texas Dairy Queen stores accessible to her.56
Under the ADA, anyone who "owns, leases, or operates" a place of
public accommodation must not allow barriers to the enjoyment of
the premises by persons with disabilities.57 Dairy Queen
responded to the lawsuit by asserting that it did not own or oper-
ate the San Antonio stores. 8
The plaintiff asserted that because of the extensive control
asserted by the franchisor, that Dairy Queen was really an opera-
tor of the facilities.59 The plaintiff further asserted that Dairy
Queen retained the right to set standards for building and equip-
ment maintenance and Dairy Queen had the right to "veto" pro-
posed structural changes.6 ° Other control factors that the plaintiff
asserted made Dairy Queen an operator included the right to con-
trol accounting procedures, personnel uniforms, use of trade-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 688 (citing Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 328 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1966)).
53. Id. (citing Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967)).
54. 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996).
55. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1990).
56. Neff, 58 F.3d at 1064.
57. 42 U.S.C. §12182(a), §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
58. Neff, 58 F.3d at 1064-65.
59. Id. at 1065.
60. Id. at 1067-68.
[Vol. 20:91
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marks, equipment requirements, and supplies. 61 Further,
franchisees were required to follow the standard "Dairy Queen"
management system, as prescribed in the Store Management
Operations Manual.62 This covered product preparation, mer-
chandising, sanitation procedures, and employee training.63
Despite these claims, the court determined that Dairy Queen
did not own the San Antonio stores and did not "operate" the
stores.64 Therefore, Dairy Queen could not be held liable under
the ADA for violations at the franchisee facilities.
In summary, the actual agency theory seems to render vary-
ing degrees of success for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who are harmed by
actions of local franchisees are quick to point out the extensive
controls put in place by franchisors. 65 The typical franchise rela-
tionship usually provides for extensive controls and this provides
plaintiffs with built-in ammunition for their case. It appears the
most powerful factors which could give rise to successful lawsuits
under this theory are factors which will involve the franchisor in
the day-to-day affairs of the franchisee. If the franchisor conducts
regular inspections and then places demands on the franchisee for
corrections, this is particularly helpful to the victim's case.
B. Apparent Agency Theory
Lawsuits against franchisors for wrongful actions of a fran-
chisee typically include allegations of an actual agency and an
apparent agency. If extensive controls are not in place, the victim
will seek to establish that there is at least an appearance of an
agency such that the franchisor should be held liable.66 It is true
that the public is often led to believe that it is dealing with a
national franchisor rather than a locally owned franchisee. When
one enters a franchise operation it is common to see signs, logos,
and packaging all referring to a national franchisor without refer-
ence to local ownership. 67 Some franchise operations intention-
ally create the appearance that the local operation is part of the
national organization through the widespread use of logos and
61. Id. at 1067.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1068-69.
65. John C. Monica, Franchisor Liability to Third Parties, 49 Mo. L. REV. 309,
313 (1984).
66. Carter, supra note 5, at 384.
67. Id.
19971
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advertising schemes. The Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec.
267 provides as follows:
One who represents that another is his servant or agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or
skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third per-
son for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appear-
ing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such. 68
Victims' attorneys hope that the franchisor has pushed a
national image on the public which arguably misled the public
into thinking they were dealing with the franchisor rather than a
locally owned franchisee. The plaintiffs' attorneys will be
delighted if there are no signs indicating local ownership on the
premises.
From the franchisors' perspective, it appears that requiring
signs indicating local ownership should be mandated. It would
seem that this notice would have little negative impact on the
buying public and would make the creation of an apparent agency
less likely.
Turning to case law, attorneys for franchisors and attorneys
for victims will again find divergent outcomes on similar cases
when an apparent agency theory is asserted. Two recent cases
involving Best Western hotels resulted in opposite holdings. In
Giamo v. Congress Motor Inn, Corp.,69 a guest at a Best Western
hotel was injured as he left his hotel room to go to work.7 ° As the
guest left the hotel, he drove down an inclined driveway, skidded
on ice and lost control of his vehicle.7 1 The car struck another car
and the guest was injured. 72 The guest suffered further injuries
when he slipped as he got out of the car. 3 He sued the local owner
and Best Western for slip and fall injuries on the hotel driveway.74
Best Western, however, is not set up on a franchise basis; rather it
is a non-profit membership corporation whose members are own-
ers of independently owned hotels and motels.75 Best Western
International does not share in the profits of members and it is
68. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
69. 847 F. Supp. 4 (D.R.I. 1994).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Giamo, 847 F. Supp. at 6.
100 [Vol. 20:91
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prohibited by its articles of incorporation from operating or man-
aging member properties.76
The plaintiff argued that Best Western had an apparent
agency relationship with the local hotel.7 7 The plaintiff asserted
that Best Western asserted significant control over the hotel and
that it encouraged third persons to think they were dealing with
Best Western International when they sought lodging at a Best
Western facility.78 The plaintiff submitted copies of Renovation
and Refurbishing Guidelines which allegedly demonstrated signif-
icant control over the facility.79 If this agreement were violated,
membership could be canceled."' Best Western also required that
the Best Western logo be prominently displayed on the facility's
premises and in all advertising.81 Rules and Regulations of Best
Western also directed the operation of the reservation system,
administration, lobby and front office, buildings, grounds, and
public areas.8 2 The regulations went so far as to direct the local
facility as to snow removal.8 3 On the basis of these facts the court
held that a guest could reasonably conclude that the hotel was
76. Id.
77. Id. at 7. The court stated:
An agent is cloaked with apparent authority when the principal acts in a
way that causes a third party to reasonably believe that the agent is
authorized to act on the principal's behalf. Apparent authority may be
created by any manifestation by the principal that he has authorized or
consents to the agent's conduct. Such manifestations may be verbal,
written or implicit in the principal's conduct.
Id.
78. Id. at 8. The court stated:
Here plaintiff urges the theory of apparent authority arguing that Best
Western International, through its Rules and Regulations, imposes
substantial control over each member's operations. Further, Best
Western International encourages third persons to think they are
dealing with Best Western International when they seek and obtain
lodging at a Best Western facility, and consequently, third persons
reasonably believe this is so.
Id.
79. Giamo, 847 F. Supp. at 9.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court specifically quoted the snow removal requirement stating:
"Snow removal shall be performed when necessary by plowing and/or use of a
melting compound. Icy conditions shall be corrected with an appropriate melting
compound or traction providing material." Id.
1997]
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owned by Best Western and operated by its employees, 4 There-
fore, the court held that summary judgment was not appropriate
for Best Western and the case should proceed to trial.
In Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc.,8 5 plaintiff, a disc
jockey was sexually assaulted in the ladies' room of a Penn-
sylvania Best Western hotel.8 6 The plaintiff alleged that the hotel
provided inadequate security. She was at the hotel working as a
disc jockey for a campus ministry group's social function. s At
about 1:30 a.m., the plaintiff left the ballroom to use the ladies'
restroom, where she was attacked and sexually assaulted.88 The
plaintiff alleged that Best Western held itself out as the owner/
operator of the hotel, that she relied on this representation, and as
a result Best Western could be held vicariously liable for the negli-
gent acts of the local hotel.8 9 The court, however, concluded that
the doctrine of apparent authority simply was not applicable in
this case.9 ° The court noted that in its opinion the plaintiff never
relied on apparent authority on the night of the attack.91 She was
present at the facility not because it was a Best Western hotel, but
because she was hired to work as a disc jockey.92 She never con-
tracted or negotiated with Best Western or the local hotel.93 She
simply agreed to show up at the designated place on the desig-
nated night and play music for a social function sponsored by the
84. Id.
85. 634 A.2d 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
86. Id. at 624.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 629.
90. Id. at 629-30.
91. Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 630.
92. Id. The court stated:
Under the facts of this case, we fail to see how appellant can be said to
have relied upon the apparent authority of Penn Stroud to avoid being
the victim of this random act of violence. Our review of the record
indicates that appellant has presented no evidence which even remotely
supports her allegation that she relied upon the fact that Penn Stroud
represented Best Western, as its agent, on the night she was sexually
assaulted. As explained, appellant was hired by a third party, a campus
ministry group, wholly unrelated to either Best Western or Penn
Stroud, to work as a disc jockey on the night of April 24, 1987 at the Best
Western Pocono Inn. Appellant neither contracted nor negotiated with
Best Western or Penn Stroud; the ministry group specified to appellant
where the function was to take place.
Id.
93. Id.
102 [Vol. 20:91
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ministry group.94 She did not rely on the name "Best Western."95
She would have appeared at most any location the campus minis-
try group had designated.96 Therefore, the court affirmed the dis-
missal of the lawsuit as against Best Western.97
In the 1995 case of Watson v. Howard Johnson Franchise Sys-
tems, Inc.,9 the failure to display a sign indicating local owner-
ship came back to haunt a franchisor. In this case, a husband and
wife were robbed and assaulted as they brought their luggage into
a HoJo Inn. 99 The plaintiff asserted an apparent agency theory
against Howard Johnson.' 0 0 Numerous billboards were used to
advertise the hotel through the use of the franchisor's name, and
the advertisements did not refer to the franchisee as owner and
operator of the hotel.' 01 It was also pointed out that Howard
Johnson required prior approval of all advertising, so it was aware
that the billboards did not indicate local ownership. 10 2 The
franchise agreement required the franchisee to permanently dis-
play a plaque at the registration area stating that the hotel was
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 630. The court stated:
She simply agreed to show up at the designated place, on the designated
night and play music for a social function sponsored by the ministry
group. Our review of the record not only indicates that she did not rely
on the fact that the designated place carried the name "Best Western,"
but that it appears she would have performed the service she had
contracted to at most any location the campus ministry group had
designated. Thus, Best Western cannot be held vicariously liable for the
alleged negligence of Penn Stroud under the theory of apparent
authority.
Id.
97. Id.
98. 453 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
99. Id. at 758.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court stated:
The Watsons contend the evidence demonstrates that Howard Johnson
held out the hotel as its own and that they relied on such
representations to the extent that Williams was Howard Johnson's
apparent agent .... Williams used numerous billboards to advertise its
hotel as a "HoJo Inn by Howard Johnson." The advertisements did not
refer to Williams as the owner and operator of the franchise. The sign in
the parking lot of the hotel again referred to the hotel as a HoJo Inn by
Howard Johnson.
Id. at 758-59.
102. Id. at 759.
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independently operated, but no such sign was displayed."0 3 Fur-
ther damaging Howard Johnson's case was the fact that it had
specifically noted in an inspection report that such a sign was
lacking. 10 4 The court concluded that there was a question of fact
as to the existence of an apparent agency, resulting in a reversal
of an earlier summary judgment award in favor of Howard
Johnson. 105
These cases suggest that the threat of an apparent authority
theory can be diminished simply by insisting that conspicuous
signs be placed in franchise operations indicating local ownership
and operation. The presence of such signs greatly decreases any
chance a plaintiff may have relied on the name of the franchisor.
Franchisors who refuse to require these signs apparently feel such
information will negatively impact business operations or they
simply have not deemed such notice necessary.
In the 1996 case of Perry v. Burger King Corp. 10 6 the plaintiff
alleged that he ate at a New York City Burger King and was
denied use of the bathroom because he is black. 10 7 He asked for
the key to the restroom and was told that the bathroom was out of
order.'08 He asserted "that he saw white patrons leaving the rest
room, and again requested the key, but was denied once more."109
He alleged that "after another white patron emerged from the rest
room,... [that] he held open the door and observed that the facili-
ties were in working order."110 Burger King alleged that the res-
taurant was a locally owned independent contractor and that it
was not an agent or employee of Burger King."' The plaintiff
alleged that Burger King exerted a high level of control over the
franchisee such that it controlled and regulated the day-to-day
operations such that it resulted in an apparent agency relation-
ship. 112 The plaintiff alleged that there were no signs indicating
local ownership and that the local and the national franchisor
acted in concert for the purpose of maintaining to the public that
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 924 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
107. Id. at 551.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Perry, 924 F. Supp. at 554.
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the restaurant is a Burger King restaurant." 3 Burger King was
dismissed as a defendant through a grant of summary judg-
ment.11 14 The court felt that the evidence of an apparent agency
was merely speculation or conjecture." 5
In summary, the apparent agency theory is the biggest threat
to franchisors. Although the cases seem to send mixed messages
about the predictability of success, there are enough cases avail-
able to suggest that franchisors cannot ignore this theory. The
very nature of a franchise relationship necessitates a certain
amount of control. The more the control the more likely an appar-
ent agency can be created. There appears to be no logical reason
why a franchisor would not insist on the use of prominent signs to
indicate local ownership. It would seem that such signs would
have little negative impact on the public's decision to do business
with a franchisee or not and the sign gives the franchisor an addi-
tional argument that allegations of an apparent agency relation-
ship is not supported by the facts. National advertising which
indicates that many franchise operations are locally owned would
also appear to be a wise approach with very little negative ramifi-
cations. Clearly franchisors who wish to avoid liability should
also be careful to avoid the creation of controls to the point that it
is unclear whether the franchisor is in charge or a local owner is in
charge.
C. Negligence Theory
The third theory commonly used against a franchisor is negli-
gence. In order to establish a negligence claim, four elements
must be proven: the existence of a duty," 6 breach of the duty of
care,1 7 causation,"" and damages. 1 9 Almost anytime someone is
injured, it is predictable that the victim will allege that another
failed to use reasonable care under the circumstance resulting in
damages or injuries. The context in which franchisors are affected
by this theory typically involves a situation where someone is
injured while on the premises of a local franchisee and then the
113. Id.
114. Id. at 555.
115. Id. at 554.
116. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 320 (1979).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 (1979).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1979); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
119. Id.
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victim seeks to recover from the franchisor for his/her injuries. 2 '
Two McDonald's cases with opposite outcomes typify the use of a
negligence theory for injuries inflicted by the criminal actions of
third parties at franchise locations.
Martin v. McDonald's Corp. ,121 a murder and robbery took
place after closing hours at an Oak Forest, Illinois fast food res-
taurant.122 Prior to the robbery and murder, the franchisor had
voluntarily performed a security inspection of this particular
McDonald's restaurant. 123 The inspector had recommended that
several changes be made concerning the closing procedures at the
store. 124 The changes recommended included that "no one should
go out or throw garbage out the back door after dark. Trash and
grease were to be taken out the side glass door at least one hour
prior to closing by one employee while another employee watched
activity from inside."' 25 The inspector also recommended that
locks be changed and a new alarm system be installed for the back
door.126 The inspector who made the recommendations never
returned to view the night time closing procedures to see if the
changes had been implemented. 12
7
On the night of the robbery, six teenage female workers were
working to clean up and close the business. 128  A criminal
appeared at the back of the restaurant and ordered the crew into
the refrigerator. 129 The robber forced the assistant manager to
open the safe and get him money.' 30 In the course of moving the
six-member crew into the refrigerator, one employee was fatally
shot and two others were assaulted by the lone criminal.13 1 The
franchisor was sued for negligence. The trial court held in favor of
120. For an interesting negligence case involving a robber who shoots and
injures a customer see Taco Bell v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987).
121. 572 N.E.2d 1073 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991).
122. Id. at 1076.
123. Id. at 1077. McDonald's Corporation had recognized that security was a
problem at all franchise operations and has set up a branch of its corporation to
deal with security problems. Id. A regional security officer for McDonald's
undertook the duty of checking for security problems and to communicate
security policies to store managers. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1077.
126. Id.
127. Martin, 572 N.E.2d at 1078.
128. Id. at 1076.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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the estate of the deceased worker and awarded $1,003,445.37.132
The trial court also held in favor of the two assaulted employees
awarding each of them $125,000.133
On appeal, the franchisor asserted that it owed no duty to the
employees since it was merely the licensor of the business.1 3 4 The
court disagreed and upheld the trial court decision. The court con-
cluded that McDonald's ordinarily had no duty to protect plaintiffs
from criminal acts of third parties, but it had voluntarily recog-
nized the threat of robbery and undertaken the review of the
security procedures. 3 ' Once McDonald's assumed the duty to
review the security procedures, it had a responsibility to perform
that duty with care and competence. 136 Failing to follow up on its
earlier recommendations left McDonald's saddled with a large
negligence judgment.'3 7
In Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp. ,138 a franchisee-employee
sued the franchisor under a negligence theory. The plaintiff was
working at a McDonald's restaurant in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.139
"At approximately 10:00 p.m., two men entered the restaurant,
were served, and sat down in the dining area to eat their food."' 4 °
The plaintiff was sweeping the floor, and the two men took her
outside the restaurant to the parking lot where they attempted to
force her inside their car. 14 1 The plaintiff resisted and a manage-
rial employee came to her assistance.' 4 2 With the other
employee's assistance, plaintiff escaped and returned to the res-
taurant.143 As the plaintiff sat down to compose herself, the man-
agerial assistant returned to work, helping a drive through
customer. 14 The managerial assistant noticed that the assailants
remained outside, driving their car from one side of the parking
lot to the other, but the managerial assistant did not lock the
132. Id. at 1075.
133. Martin, 572 N.E.2d at 1076 (These damages were assessed for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress.).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1078.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 522 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 1994).
139. Id. at 810.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Hoffnagle, 522 N.W.2d at 810.
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doors or call police. 145 Some time later one of the assailants again
entered the restaurant and again attempted to take the plaintiff
outside. 146 The managerial assistant again intervened, causing
the assailants to leave.'14  Finally the managerial assistant called
the police and the plaintiff made an official complaint against the
assailants.148 The plaintiff filed suit against McDonald's alleging
negligence. 49 The primary allegation of the plaintiff was that
McDonald's negligently failed to provide security or to provide
adequate security training for the franchisee. 5 ° The plaintiff
alleged that the managerial employee was not appropriately
trained because she failed to lock the doors or telephone the police
after the first attack on the plaintiff.15  The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of McDonald's concluding that
McDonald's owed no duty toward the employee of a local franchise
under these facts.'
52
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the judgment in favor of
McDonald's, concluding that McDonald's did not retain sufficient
control over the operations of the restaurant to impose a duty of
security upon the franchisor as toward its franchisee's employ-
ees. 153 The court felt that the controls asserted by McDonald's
over the franchisee were simply to require adherence to the
"McDonald's system", to adopt and use McDonald's business
manuals, and to follow other general guidelines outlined by
McDonald's.15 4 Since the day-to-day control of the employees was
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Hoffnagle, 522 N.W.2d at 812.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 814.
154. Id. The court stated:
The franchisee, the Mrozinskis, rather than the franchisor, McDonald's,
has the power to control the details of the restaurant's day-to-day
operation. The Mrozinskis own the business equipment, operate the
business, hold the operating licenses and permits, determine the wages,
and provide the basic daily training and insurance for the franchisee's
employees. The Mrozinskis, not McDonald's, hire, fire, supervise and
discipline the franchisee's employees. On the other hand, McDonald's
simply has the authority to require the franchisee to adhere to the
"McDonald's system," to adopt and use McDonald's business manuals,
and to follow other general guidelines outlined by McDonald's.
108 [Vol. 20:91
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handled by the franchisee, the franchisor could not be held liable
when a co-employee failed to immediately call for police protection
upon a disturbance.
Whenever personal injuries are suffered, it is likely that a
negligence claim will be asserted. The beauty of a negligence the-
ory from a plaintiffs perspective is that it can be applied in almost
any situation. Whether a franchisor has acted reasonably obvi-
ously is decided on a case-by-case basis, often resulting in unpre-
dictable outcomes. The numbers of negligence claims seems likely
to continue to explode as more and more businesses are operated
on a franchise basis. It appears that the best approach for a
franchisor and franchisee to take is to simply take an overly cau-
tious approach in all business situations. If the franchisor does
make security inspections, it is clear that any recommendations
later made must be subsequently followed up on to ensure that
the recommendations are implemented. Failure to follow up will
likely result in negligence liability.
III. NORTH CAROLINA FRANCHISOR LIABILITY DECISIONS
North Carolina has decided a limited number of cases in this
area. The most important cases are motel cases decided in 1987
and 1988 against Ramada Inn and Holiday Inn.155 In Hayman v.
Ramada Inn, Inc. ,16 a flight attendant trainee for Piedmont Air-
lines was assaulted while a guest at a Winston-Salem, North Car-
olina Ramada Inn.' 57 The trainee unsuccessfully sued Ramada
Inn on the basis of an actual and apparent agency theories. The
second case, Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,' 5 8 has been widely
cited. In this case, Holiday Inn was held liable when a husband
and wife were assaulted when they were checking into their hotel
room.' 5 9 Holiday Inn was held liable on an apparent agency the-
ory for failing to indicate to the plaintiffs that the hotel was locally
owned.' 6° The jury award of $500,000 was upheld.161 In holding
Holiday Inn liable on an apparent authority theory, the court felt
Id.
155. For a more in-depth review of these two North Carolina cases see Hanson,
supra note 7, at 199-200.
156. 86 N.C. App. 274, 357 S.E.2d 394 (1987).
157. Id. at 275, 357 S.E.2d at 395.
158. 844 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988).
159. Id. at 159.
160. Id. at 160.
161. Id.
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compelled to explain why Holiday Inn was liable, while Ramada
Inn was not held liable the year before in the Hayman case. The
court distinguished the two cases primarily by noting that in
Hayman the plaintiff stayed at the Ramada Inn pursuant to her
employer's directives while in Crinkley, the plaintiff exercised free
choice in choosing to stay at the Holiday Inn. 162 Also, in Crinkley,
the plaintiffs' choice of lodging was influenced by national adver-
tising which failed to indicate local ownership. The Crinkley deci-
sion still causes concern for franchisors in North Carolina in that
they may be held liable for wrongful acts at the local level even if
day-to-day control is not present.
In 1996, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided a
franchise case with an unusual twist. What made this case unu-
sual was that a franchisee was attempting to avoid liability by
asserting it was an agent of the franchisor. In most cases involv-
ing franchise liability, a third party is the one seeking to establish
the existence of an actual agency relationship. In Alamance
County Board of Education v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, 163 a local
franchise dealership attempted to avoid liability by asserting the
existence of an actual or apparent agency relationship with Gen-
eral Motors. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, a local franchisee received
an invitation to bid on approximately 1200 school bus chassis for a
number of school districts in North Carolina.' 6 ' The franchisee
consulted with GMC Truck Division regarding prices and availa-
bility and submitted a bid.' 65 The bid was accepted and the initial
deadline for orders from the school districts was set at July 31,
1990.166 A number of bus contracts were successfully completed
and performed without problems.' 67 A subsequent problem did
develop when General Motors agreed to extend the time for plac-
ing orders. 168 Orders were placed, but were not completed as
transmission shortages developed. 169 The school district plaintiffs
notified Bobby Murray Chevrolet that the chassis would be
purchased from another source and any increased costs would be
162. Id. at 167.
163. 121 N.C. App. 222, 465 S.E.2d 306 (1996).
164. Id. at 223, 465 S.E.2d at 308.
165. Id. at 224, 465 S.E.2d at 308.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Alamance County Bd. of Educ., 121 N.C. App. at 225, 465 S.E.2d at 309.
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sought from the dealership. 170 The school districts later sued for
and recovered over $150,000.171
Bobby Murray Chevrolet attempted to avoid liability by
asserting that General Motors breached its contract and that
Bobby Murray was merely acting as an agent of General Motors
and therefore should not be liable to the school districts.172 To
support this assertion, Bobby Murray argued that although it was
not normally an agent of General Motors, it became an agent
rather than a franchisee as a result of General Motor's extension
of the time period for bus orders from July 31 to August 31.173
Bobby Murray asserted that this action constituted day-to-day
control by General Motors over the operation of its franchisee.
174
The court disagreed, noting that the dealer agreement between
General Motors and Bobby Murray specifically provided that
neither party was an agent or representative of the other and the
extension of the day for bids did not constitute control such as to
give rise to a principal-agent relationship. 1 75 The court gave little
credence to Bobby Murray's argument that there was an apparent
agency relationship by stating that "[nio evidence establishes that
GM represented Bobby Murray to be its agent or permitted Bobby
Murray to represent itself as GM's agent. Thus, Bobby Murray's
apparent agency argument also fails."'76 Since Bobby Murray
failed to establish itself as an agent, it could not escape liability.
In summary, it appears that North Carolina, by its decision in
Crinkley, established a precedent of significant liability potential
for franchise liability. Franchisors in North Carolina must
demand conspicuous notice of local ownership to avoid the crea-
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 231, 465 S.E.2d at 312.
173. Id.. at 231, 465 S.E.2d at 312-13.
174. Id. at 232, 465 S.E.2d at 313.
175. Alamance County Bd. of Educ., 121 N.C. App. at 232, S.E.2d at 313. The
court stated:
Whether an agency relationship was created in this case is determined
by "the nature and extent of control and supervision retained and
exercised by [GM] over the methods or details of conducting the day-to-
day operation [of Bobby Murray] .... We do not believe extension of the
date by which Bobby Murray could place orders for school bus chassis in
any way constituted an exercise of day-to-day control by GM over the
operation of its franchisee.
Id. (citing Hayman v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 86 N.C. App. 274, 357 S.E.2d 394
(1987)).
176. Id.
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tion of an apparent agency relationship. Further, franchisors
must devise their systems in ways which avoid meddling in day-
to-day operational activities. Failure to do this will likely result in
a finding of an actual or apparent agency relationship with full
liability resting on the franchisor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Franchise liability law is still in a confusing state. Case deci-
sions vary widely from state to state. Some decisions indicate that
typical franchise provisions constitute control and liability while
other decisions indicate that typical controls are not sufficient to
impose liability. 17 7 The legal system has a responsibility to indi-
cate what kind of controls will be allowed without the imposition
of liability on the franchisor. The present system sets up a tight-
rope situation where the franchisor feels compelled to impose con-
trols to assure uniform activities, but there is a fear of becoming
involved in the day-to-day activities of the franchisee operations
as this will result in devastating liability.
Until a clearer directive is delivered by the courts, franchisors
should be at a minimum requiring that signs be placed in all
franchise operations indicating local ownership and continuously
reviewing legal decisions in states where they operate. Of course,
procedures should be continuously reviewed to implement safety
measures which will hopefully minimize injuries.
Unfortunately, franchisors probably need to start accumulat-
ing data on criminal activities at local operations. It appears that
one of the highest risks to franchising liability at this time is hav-
ing franchise operations in high crime areas. Negligence judg-
ments will be increasingly difficult to defend against if there are a
large number of recent criminal acts at a location where a plaintiff
is injured. Franchise operations in locations that have been
targeted by criminals in the past are going to have to face the
extremely difficult decision as to whether or not to hire full-time
security guards. Whether the legal system will or should force
franchisors into this position is going to be the perplexing issue
heading into the year 2000 and beyond.
177. For a discussion of public policies for and against increased franchisor
liability see Hanson, supra note 7, at 192-94.
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